

Chapter Four

THE DEMOGRAPHY OF YOUTH

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the present demographic situation of youth. Trends and prospects in the age distribution of the population, particularly as they relate to youth, are discussed first. The geographic distribution of youth and their mobility in terms of internal and international migration follow. Finally, discussion of aspects of marital status is undertaken. A brief discussion of the impact of these trends on public policy concludes the chapter.

At the outset, it is in order to recall that youth is defined by the United Nations as the age group between 15 and 24 years of age. Youth represents the transition from childhood to adulthood and involves biological transformation as well as economic, social and institutional adaptation.

The youth population in the world was estimated at 1.02 billion in 1995, or 18 percent of total (United Nations, 1997d). 84 percent of these youth live in developing countries, where numbers are expected to increase well into the twenty-first century (Table 1). Youth as a percentage of the total population has decreased in the developed countries, in most of Eastern Europe, and in a few countries of Western Asia. It was as low as 12 percent in 1995 in Germany and Finland. Youth as percentage of total population remains high in most of the developing world and even in some newly industrialized countries, such as Indonesia where it reaches 21 percent of the population (United Nations, 1997d).

Table 1: Total and youth population in the world and in developing countries, 1995-2015
(Millions, percent)

	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
World population	5,687	6,091	6,491	6,891	7,286
World youth	1,024	1,066	1,155	1,185	1,188
Youth percentage of world population	18.0	17.5	17.8	17.2	16.3
Population in developing countries	4,516	4,904	5,293	5,684	6,072
Youth in developing countries	863	902	990	1,035	1,050
Youth percentage of population in developing countries	19.1	18.4	18.7	18.2	17.3
Youth in developing countries as percentage youth in the world	84.3	84.7	85.7	87.3	88.5

Source: United Nations (1997d).

II. YOUTH POPULATION

Lebanon, being part of the developing world, is a demographically young country. The population (adjusted for under-enumeration) numbered 3.1 million persons in 1996. The youth population numbered 585,000 and thus accounted for just under 19 percent of the total population. The number of young persons is expected to continue to increase during the next twenty years and is projected to reach 714,200 in the year 2016 (Table 2). The relative importance of youth is projected to gradually decrease to just under 17 percent by the year 2011 and to 17.3 percent in the year 2016.

Table 2: Proportion of youth in total population, 1970-2016
(Thousands, percent)

	1970	1996	2001	2006	2011	2016
Youth	376.8	585.2	612.4	628.2	655.4	714.2
Total	2,126.3	3,090.7	3,363.5	3,636.0	3,897.6	4,138.6
Percent	17.7	18.9	18.2	17.3	16.9	17.3

Source: Lebanon: Ministry of Planning, 1970; Ministry of Social Affairs (unpublished data).

The relative importance of youth in the country in 1995 was similar to that of other countries in the ESCWA region (i.e. Arab countries of West Asia and Egypt), where it ranged from 18 percent to 23 percent. The relative importance of youth in the ESCWA region is expected to increase by just over one percent in the 1995-2005 period, to 20.7 percent. The latter development would result from contrasting tendencies in Jordan (from 22.6 percent to 18.8 percent) and Lebanon where the relative importance will decrease, and in Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia where an increase is projected (from 20.7 percent, 18.6 percent, and 18.1 percent to 23.2 percent, to 20.9 percent and 18.8 percent, respectively).

III. AGE DISTRIBUTION

The age distribution of the population changed significantly between 1970 and 1996. While in 1970 the age pyramid had a broad base, typical of a developing country with high fertility, in 1996 it became more typical of countries at a somewhat advanced stage of demographic transition. This is due largely to a decline in fertility levels that resulted in a decrease in the proportion of children (0-14 years of age), from 43 percent in 1970 to 32 percent in 1996, and a rise in the proportion of elderly (65 years and over), from 5 percent to 7 percent in the same period. This demographic transition is likely to be completed in the next 25 years as is indicated by a comparison between the expected age distribution of the population in the year 2021 with that of France at present (Charts 1 to 4).

“...there has been a gradual ageing of the population. The average age rose from 21 years in 1970 to 24 years in 1996.... it will rise in the next twenty years to a level close to 26 years in the year 2016.”

In other words, there has been a gradual ageing of the population. The average age rose from 21 years in 1970 to 24 years in 1996. Official projections show that this process is likely

to continue in the foreseeable future, as long as fertility continues to decline, as expected. As seen from Table 3, the average age will rise in the next twenty years to 26 years by the year 2016.

Table 3: Average age of the population, 1970-2016
(Years)

Year	1970	1996	2001	2006	2011	2016
Average Age	20.9	23.6	23.9	24.4	25.1	26.0

Source: Calculated by MADMA on the basis of data from Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs and UNFPA (1996).

A more expressive indication of ageing is obtained by comparing rates of growth of the various age groups in the population. It is clear from Table 4 that the rate of growth of the elderly will exceed that of the total population throughout the next 25 years. It will also exceed the rate of growth of all other age groups, except that of the working population. The average yearly rate of growth of the elderly during this period is expected to be 1.9 percent as against a rate of less than 1.4 percent for the total population. The youth population is expected to grow at a rate close to 1 percent, while the age group 0-14 years will likely grow at a rate of only 0.4 percent

It is interesting to note also that the highest rate of growth during this period is expected to be in the working age group (25-64 years) and this will remain so until the high fertility levels of the past have worked their way through the population age distribution. In fact, for the coming 25 years, the average rate of growth of this group (2 percent) is expected to be at a level comparable to that of the elderly (Table 4). It is clear, however, that if the present fertility remains constant or continues to decline, the ageing of the population will eventually be reflected in an increasingly higher proportion of the aged population at the expense of the working age population.

Table 4: Rates of growth of children, youth, working age and elderly populations: 1996-2001 to 2016-2021
(Percent per year)

Age Group/Year	1996-2001	2001-2006	2006-2011	2011-2016	2016-2021	Average
0-14	1.28	1.13	0.60	-0.32	-0.64	0.41
15-24	0.91	0.51	0.85	1.72	1.08	1.01
25-64	2.32	2.23	2.06	1.81	1.65	2.01
65+	1.76	1.83	1.63	1.82	2.51	1.91
Total	1.69	1.56	1.39	1.20	1.03	1.37

Source: Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs and UNFPA (1996) (Adjusted data).

CHARTS 1, 2, 3 & 4 (to cover the whole page)

One major socio-economic implication of these demographic changes is indicated by the change in the “demographic” dependency ratio during this period. This dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of the mostly dependent population (under 15 years and over 65 years) to the population of working age. This ratio decreased from 91 percent in 1970 to 63 percent in 1996, relieving some of the dependency burden on the economically active group. This latter rate is comparable to the average of 64 percent for Less Developed Countries (United Nations, 1996). The decline comes principally from the decline in the proportion of children in the total population, and in spite of the rise in the proportion of the elderly (Table 5) (Charts 5 and 6). According to official medium projections, this trend is expected to continue over the next 25 years, that is, until the year 2021 when the dependency ratio will reach 49 percent. The implication of this trend is that the future burden of support that will be carried by today’s youth, compared with that carried presently by their parents, will tend to decline and will shift gradually away from the support of children towards the direct (family) or indirect (through social security) support of the elderly.

Table 5: Sex-age distribution of the population by major age groups, 1970 and 1996
(Percent of total)

Age group	1970			1996		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Children (0 -14)	42.9	42.3	42.6	32.5	30.4	31.5
Youth (15 -24)	17.8	17.6	17.7	19.4	18.4	18.9
Working Age (25 -64)	34.3	34.9	34.6	41.1	43.9	42.5
Elderly (65 +)	4.9	5.0	5.1	7.0	7.2	7.1
Dependency ratio	-	-	91	-	-	63
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: Lebanon: Ministry of Planning (1970); Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs and UNFPA (1996).

It should be noted, however, that Lebanese parents tend to support their children longer and at a higher total cost per child with the increasing level of education. Furthermore, the period of support of the elderly may also be increasing due to longer life. Finally, incomes in general have not kept pace with the rise in basic needs due to the economic problems resulting from the war. Consequently, the decline in the *demographic* dependency ratio will not necessarily be translated into an effective decline in *economic* dependency, that is, the economic burden to the working population. All that can be said with confidence is that this economic burden of support would have been much worse had the demographic dependency ratio remained the same or increased.

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CHARTS 5 and 6

IV. THE DISTRIBUTION OF YOUTH

The geographic distribution of youth among the different areas of the country is more or less even. The percentage of youth in the total population varies from 19 percent in the highly urbanized Mohafazat of Beirut to little over 21 percent in the more rural Mohafazat of the Bekaa (Table 6). It appears, therefore, that rural-to-urban migration of youth is partly compensated by higher rural fertility.

Table 6: Youth distribution by geographic area, 1996
(Percent of total)

Age Group	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North Lebanon	South Lebanon	Bekaa	Nabatieh
15-19	9.3	9.4	11.1	10.6	11.1	9.8
20-24	9.7	9.8	9.5	9.5	10.1	9.8
Total	19.0	19.2	20.6	20.1	21.2	19.6

Source: Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs and UNFPA (1996).

The sex distribution of the 1996 population indicates an overall sex ratio of 0.98 (i.e., 98 males for 100 females) compared to 1.03 in 1970. It is less than one for all age groups after the age of 25 (Table 7). This is due to the greater male emigration, higher mortality rate of young males during the war and, to some extent, a greater improvement in the health status of females. It is interesting to note here that the “missing males”, being mainly young to middle aged, result in a shortage of marriage partners for women in the marrying age groups. This might be one of the explanations for the increased celibacy and the later marriages among female youth (see Chapter on Youth and Family Formation).

Table 7: Sex ratios, 1970 and 1996

Age	1970	1996	Age	1970	1996
0-4	1.04	1.05	35-39	1.01	0.88
5-9	1.03	1.05	40-44	1.02	0.90
10-14	1.06	1.06	45-49	1.10	0.92
15-19	1.05	1.06	50-54	1.00	0.94
20-24	1.04	1.02	55-59	1.05	0.95
25-29	0.96	0.95	60-65	1.08	0.97
30-34	0.96	0.90	65+	1.00	0.95
Total				1.03	0.98

Sources: Lebanon: Ministry of Planning (1970); Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs and UNFPA (1996).

These demographic trends have major social and economic implications. The slow growth of the young ages will result in slow growth in the demand for education, particularly at the lower levels, and a subsequent slowdown in the demand for teachers and school facilities. The high rate of growth of the elderly, accompanied by an inevitable reduction in family-based support, will undoubtedly place a growing burden on government services relating to old age security and health. A full study of these and other social and economic implications of the rapid demographic transition taking place in the country is, therefore, urgently needed and is basic for economic and social planning.

V. MIGRATION

Both internal migration and international migrations have been important phenomena historically and remain so to the present day. The war only accentuated these two types of population movements.

1. Internal Migration

Historically, internal migration was of the classical type: from rural to urban areas. The proportion of the population classified as urban was 60 percent in 1970 and 81 percent in 1996¹. A number of factors were behind this migration: low incomes and more difficult conditions in rural areas; greater employment and work opportunities in urban areas resulting from the over-concentration of economic activities in urban areas, particularly the urban agglomeration of the capital; the greater availability of education opportunities in urban areas (see Chapter on Youth and Education); the concentration of social and cultural amenities in urban areas, particularly the capital. Since these reasons remain largely valid today, the traditionally heavy rural-to-urban migration is likely to continue in the near future unless concerted efforts are expended to ensure a geographically more balanced development.

¹ The definition of urban population and rural population varies in the 1970 and 1996 surveys. In 1970, urban areas were defined as any city or village which inhabitants exceeded 10,000 persons. However, in the final sample some of the areas defined as urban had a population size less than that defined. The 1996 survey classified as urban any agglomeration where the number of inhabitants exceeded 5,000 or if the city or town was the center of the Qada' (district) and some basic services were available. Therefore, comparisons between the two sets of data must be looked at as containing a certain margin of definitional error.

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The movement of population intensified in the past 25 years or so due to forced migration, which was due in part to the armed conflict and in part to the repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory. Several waves of forced migration occurred between 1974 and 1990. These were related to different rounds of violence that occurred in various parts of the country at different times. The government estimated that between 800,000 and one million persons were displaced at one time or another during the war (see UNDP, 1997a and Tabbarah and Osseirane, 1993). Many of these migrants did return to their homes before the end of the war, as calm was restored to their regions. The estimated number of displaced persons at the end of the war was more than 450,000 in 90,000 households. Because of the length of the war period, around 20 percent of the displaced became established in the areas to which they migrated and were not interested in returning to their places of origin. The Government estimated at the end of the war (based on field surveys) that the number of displaced persons directly concerned with the return process was around 350,000 (or 70,000 households). This was a considerable number as it constituted more than 12 percent of the total population at the time (Lebanon: Ministry of Displaced, 1992).

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It is interesting to note that the demographic features of the displaced population differed somewhat from those of the total population. First, this particular group had an average family size somewhat larger than the national average. Second, the proportion of individuals younger than 20 years of age constituted 48 percent of the displaced population compared to 44 percent for the total population. Large size families and a greater number of children only made the problem of return both more urgent and more difficult at the same time.

In 1992, displaced persons were mainly from Mount Lebanon (62 percent), followed by those from the South (24 percent) and from Beirut (8 percent). On the receiving end, the Mohafazat of Mount Lebanon also led others in receiving 53 percent of the displaced followed by the Mohafazat of Beirut, 20 percent. The Mohafazat of South Lebanon received only 8 percent of the displaced given the continuous tension caused by Israeli incursions (Lebanon: Ministry of Displaced, 1992).

The results of the historical voluntary migration and the more recent forced migration are reflected in the length of residence in given Mohafazats. One expression of this indicator of stability is the proportion of residents born in the same Mohafazat (Table 8). As expected, the highest proportion of residents of a Governorate born in other Governorates is to be found in Beirut (20 percent) and Mount Lebanon (31 percent) In the other Governorates this proportion varies between 2 percent in the Governorate of North Lebanon and 8 percent in the Governorate of South Lebanon.

Table 8: Proportion of residents of each Mohafazat born elsewhere, 1996
(Percent of total)

Beirut	Mount Lebanon	North Lebanon	South Lebanon	Bekaa
20.2	30.6	2.1	8.2	4.6

Source: Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs and UNFPA (1996)

The return process started in 1993, as indicated above in the Chapter Human Development in Lebanon. However, only a relatively small proportion of the displaced had actually returned at the end of 1997. According to Ministry of the Displaced sources, the estimated proportion of the displaced that had returned at the end of 1997 was not higher than 35 percent. In some important areas the percentages were even lower: for example, in the Chouf-Aley area only 6,174 households returned out of a total of 19,914 households displaced or 31 percent. There is an obvious need, therefore, to review the return policies and procedures with a view to improving efficiency and completing expeditiously the return process. The completion of the return of the displaced is not only important from the humanitarian point of view, it is a major action towards national reconciliation of various factions and the reintegration of the Lebanese society.

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2. International Migration

Long before the war, Lebanon was considered a country of emigration. Lebanese mainly emigrated to the Americas, West Africa and Australia. Lebanese emigration was partly redirected to the expanding oil producing countries in the Arab region as of the 1960s. The outbreak of the war in 1975 caused a massive outflow of migrants. It has been estimated that the net migration during the 1975-1990 period amounted to around 900,000 persons or about one-third of the total population (Table 9)². Of these emigrants, 40 percent went to the Arab Gulf countries (Tabbarah, 1983 and Labaki and Abou Rjeily, 1993).

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The intensive net emigration that took place during the war was bound to affect the demographic profile of the country. This is clearly apparent from the age and sex distribution of the population in 1996 compared with that of 1970. For one thing, there was a decline in the sex

² This reflects the net number of persons that left during that period. Another way of estimating the emigration is to consider the population loss due to emigration that takes into account the children that would have been born to these emigrants (Tabbarah, 1983). This number has been estimated at around 1 million present.

ratio of the working age population reflecting the greater migration of males. There was also a larger deficit in this age group overall.

Table 9: Yearly emigration during the war period, 1975-1990
(Thousands)

Year	Net emigration	Year	Net emigration
1975	400	1983	33
1976	-297	1984	62
1977	38	1985	70
1978	76	1986	74
1979	49	1987	67
1980	33	1988	67
1981	33	1989	85
1982	33	1990	72
Total			895

Source: Labaki and Abou Rjeily (1993). 1975 to 1980 figures are from Tabbarah (1983) and 1984 to 1989 from Lebanon: National Security Administration (1984 -1989).

Most emigrants belong to the professional and skilled categories of the labour force. 47 percent of the economically active emigrants belong to this category. This ratio is seven times greater than the one prevalent in the total population. In other words, the emigration of Lebanese during the war was not only massive, it included a high proportion of highly qualified individuals thus constituting a major brain drain phenomenon (Tabbarah, 1983 and Tabbarah and Osseirane, 1993).

In their own words:

An overwhelming number of Lebanese youth interviewed said that they were seriously considering leaving the country to seek employment elsewhere. Young men are especially enthusiastic about the idea of emigrating: "Lebanon is saturated right now, the job market is so competitive, and the salaries for starting out are very low. If I want to be on my own, and not depend on my family for financial support, I will have to find work outside Lebanon" says one young business graduate. Another young man says: "I would leave Lebanon if I could, I have been trying to get a visa to the United States where my brother lives, but I have been denied, I am now going to try to get a visa to Canada." Ghassan, a 24 year old computer graphics graduate, wishes to go to an Arab country: "I have seriously considered leaving Lebanon, only for financial reasons, it seems that those who go and work elsewhere, especially in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, make much more money than we can make here. I would not consider going to a foreign country though, I would rather go to an Arab country, that way I don't have to make a major adjustment in my lifestyle." A minority opinion is to stick it out in the hope that things will improve in the country. As one young man put it: "All my friends are thinking of leaving, some will be able to and some will not. I think that it is the wrong thing to do for everyone to abandon ship at this time. Lebanon is on its way back, and it needs all the potential of its younger generation. Running away won't solve anything, we have to stay here and struggle it out. Why put our efforts and talents somewhere else, we are more needed here, even if we are not appreciated".

The 1996 Population and Housing Survey provides information on the persons who migrated between 1993 and the time of the survey. However, the data are methodologically deficient in that the information was collected from households residing in the country at the time of the survey, thus missing the migration of entire households. As a result, the data tend to underestimate the total number of migrants. Moreover, since the reason for emigration may

differ between members of existing households and migrating households; they also tend to distort the causes of emigration.

With these reservations in mind, it is significant nevertheless that the highest proportion of those who migrated in recent years was in the age group 25-29 years followed by the 20-24 year age group. Men constituted the majority of people who migrated during this period (85 percent), and this applied to all age groups. The most frequently reported reason for migration was work (62 percent), followed by study (21 percent). Other cited reasons were joining family members abroad and marriage. The survey data also reveal that the main reason for emigration among the 15-19 age group was study, while work was the most frequently reported reason for the age group 20-24 years. There were, however, differences in reasons for emigration between the two genders: males migrate mostly to work, while females migrate mostly to join other family members or for marriage.

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The potential for Lebanese to emigrate remains high today, particularly in view of the prevailing economic slowdown and high unemployment among youth (see Chapter on Youth and the Labour Force), as revealed by an opinion survey on the living conditions of a nationally representative sample of 1,042 persons, conducted in 1997 (MADMA, 1997). Survey results showed that 41 percent of those interviewed had considered emigrating in the previous three years and 52 percent of those had actively sought to emigrate by inquiring at an embassy or from relatives and friends abroad. These proportions were much higher among the younger population than among other categories. Of those aged 15-29 years, 62 percent thought about emigration compared to only 34 percent of those of 30 years and over. It was also found that the desire to emigrate increased with educational attainment, with educated youth showing the highest percentage in this respect. Furthermore, 64 percent of those wishing to emigrate gave the need to improve their economic condition or that of their families as the reason for wishing to live elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that Lebanese have traditionally been a population with high propensity to emigrate but it is doubtful that the extent of the desire to emigrate was as high in the period preceding the war.

VI. MARITAL STATUS

Among youth, marriage is occurring less often and at a later stage. 4.6 percent of those married in 1996 were young persons (15-24 years), compared to 8.9 percent in 1970, a decline of 33 percent. For the age group 15-19 years, only 2.2 percent (6,600 persons) were married in 1996 against 6.8 percent (14,600 persons) in 1970. For the age group 20-24 years, 15.3 percent (43,300 persons) were married in 1996 against 29.7 percent (48,000 persons) in 1970.

For females in particular, all age groups experienced a decline in the percentage of currently married, with the most significant shift occurring for women aged 20-24 years and 25-29 years (Chart 7).

Chart 7: Married females as percent of total females: 1970-1996

Source: Lebanon: Ministry of Planning (1970);Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs and UNFPA (1996).

As a result, there was in 1996 greater predominance of single persons among youth of both sexes than was the case some 25 years ago. For youth age groups, the highest percentage of married persons was among females in rural areas. Rural youth of both sexes had a slightly higher marital rate than their counterparts in urban areas (Table 10).

Table 10: Marital status of youth by urban-rural distribution, 1996
(Percent of total)

Marital Status	15-19 years			20-24 years		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
Urban: Single	95.9	99.9	97.9	74.1	95.7	85.1
Married	4.0	0.1	2.0	25.3	4.3	14.6
Rural: Single	94.7	99.7	97.2	69.8	93.6	81.7
Married	5.3	0.2	2.7	29.9	6.3	18.1

Source: Lebanon: Ministry of Social Affairs (Unpublished data).

Note: The proportion divorced and widowed is less than 1 percent throughout this table.

The increased incidence of celibacy among youth in general is largely due to the postponement of marriage due to increased level of education and other reasons (see Chapter on Youth and Family Formation). Indeed, as seen in Table 11, the mean age at first marriage increased considerably during the past 25 years or so. For females it increased from 23 years to about 28 years and for males from 29 years to 31 years. These mean ages at first marriage are the highest in the Arab region and among the highest in the world.

Table 11: Singulate mean age of marriage for males and females, 1970 and 1996
(Years)

	1970	1996
Female	23.3	27.5
Male	28.5	30.9

Source: Lebanon: Ministry of Planning (1970); PAPCHILD (Unpublished data).

VII. CONCLUSION

Lebanon is reaching an advanced stage of demographic transition: Mortality has fallen to low levels and fertility is rapidly reaching replacement level. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. The most likely population projections show that the age distribution will continue to gradually shift towards the older age groups. In the next 25 years, the proportion of children in the total population will likely decrease considerably, while the elderly age group will increase significantly. In the meantime, and until the effect of the declining fertility has spent itself through the various age groups, the working age population will continue to grow at a pace comparable to that of the elderly. The ageing process of the population, with its concomitant changes in age distribution, should form the basis of social and economic planning. It affects demand for various goods, for education, for employment opportunities and for assistance to the aged.

Youth form more than one fifth of the population and almost one third of the labour force. Therefore, youth must constitute an important focus of development policy. According to the human development approach, youth are not to be considered only as contributors to economic development and the growth of the national product. They must also be the object of direct policies to prepare them for full participation in the political, economic and social life of the country. Understanding the demography of youth is one element in achieving this goal in a rational manner.

Internal migration, traditionally from rural to urban areas and economic in nature, intensified during the war due to forced migration caused by internal hostilities and by repeated Israeli aggression. Youth have been disproportionately affected by these population movements and by the consequences of continuing Israeli military operations, particularly in the southern part of the country.

Lebanese youth are also affected disproportionately by international migration. Since youth are rapidly achieving higher education status, international migration is becoming more of the brain drain type than migration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The most important reason for this migration at present is the pursuit of economic opportunities abroad in view of high rates of youth unemployment in the country. The need for a comprehensive review of this phenomenon and for an appropriate policy aimed at the employment of youth is obviously quite urgent (see Chapter on Youth and the Labour Force).

The rush to education of both sexes has affected the age at first marriage that has reached levels higher than in most countries of the world. It has also increased the participation of women in economic activities as well as celibacy rates, particularly among educated women. High celibacy rates are also due to postponement of marriage for economic reasons, the higher rate of migration of young males, traditional values relating to marriage and other factors (see Chapter on Youth and Family Formation). These demographic and social transformations have important implications for many aspects of social, economic and family life and present phenomena that must be studied thoroughly with a view to designing appropriate accompanying policies.